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This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and the
default risk of a sample of 59 publicly listed firms in Jordan from 1989 to 2002. The
main findings were: (1) ownership structure has significant effects on the accounting
measure of performance return on assets (ROE). (2) Government shares are
significantly negatively related to the firm’s performance ROE. (3) Defaulted firms
have a high concentration ownership compared with non-defaulted firms. Also high
foreign ownership firms have a low incidence of default. (4) Government ownership
is significantly negatively related to the firm's probability of default. (5) Both mix and
concentration ownership structure data can be used to predict the probability of
default as the largest five shareholders (C5) and government ownership fraction
(FGO) are significantly negatively correlated with the probability of the default.
These results further suggest that reducing government ownership can increase a
firm’s performance and but will also cause some firms to go bankrupt, at least in the
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Does ownership affect a firm's performance and default risk in
Jordan?
1. Introduction
The effect of ownership structure and concentration on a firm’s performance is an
important issue in the literature of finance theory. Ownership concentration may
improve performance by decreasing monitoring costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).
However, it may also work in the opposite direction. There is a possibility that large
shareholders use their control rights to achieve private benefits. Ownership structure
and concentration are considered as important factors that affect a firm’s health. If the
ownership structure and concentration affects a firm’s health, it is possible then to use
the ownership concentration and structure to predict the probability of default (PD).
Empirical studies of the relationship between the firm’s performance and ownership
concentration and structure have produced mixed results. For example, Demestz and
Lehn (1985) find no effect of ownership concentration on accounting profits, and
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find no effect on the ratio of market value to
replacement cost of assets (Tobin’s Q), although they find a positive effect of
ownership by both corporate insider and investors. On the other hand, Leech and
Leahy (1991) find a negative and significant relationship between the ownership
concentration and the firm’s value and profitability. These studies and others listed in
the literature review find conflicting results about the effect of ownership
concentration on a firm’s performance.
It is worth noting that most research on ownership structure and firm performance has
been dominated by studies conducted in developed countries. However, there is an
increasing awareness that theories originating from developed countries such as the
USA and the UK may have limited applicability to emerging markets. Emerging
markets have different characteristics such as different political, economic and
institutional conditions, which limit the application of developed markets’ empirical
models. Recent studies of corporate governance suggest that geographical position,
the tax system, industrial development and cultural characteristics along with other
factors affect ownership structure which in turn have impacts on a firm’s performance
and its default risk (Pedersen and Thompson 1997). There is a significant lack of
applied studies dealing with financial distress in Middle Eastern countries, especially
in Jordan.
Jordan provides an excellent case to study the relation between ownership structure
and firm performance. Jordanian share issue privatisation is an on going program.
Managing state holdings in Jordanian listed companies has become a top government
priority. There is evidence that the government supports the private sector to take over
and participate more in economic growth. Privatisation was part of the overall
economic package that the government has adopted since the early nineties, namely
the economic adjustment program, and self-reliance in the aftermath of the economic
crisis that befell the country. Thus the government went though privatisation, as
Jordan needs to open up its market to the world, through partnership agreements with
the European Union (EU) and accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The conclusions of some official surveys (“privatisation in Jordan” in Amman Stock
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Exchange website) demonstrated “the prevalence in the public sector institutions and
corporations of a large degree of inefficiency in the administrative and employment
policies, squander of public funds, administrative archaism, substandard services and
high indebtedness, while the private sector firms were yielding higher returns and
results and generating better job opportunities, given the high level of efficiency in the
administrative and employment policies.” Therefore, it is expected that the
privatisation in Jordan can affect a firm’s performance and the probability of default
in a positive way.
Unlike previous studies, this study will investigate the effect of ownership structure
on a firm’s performance and the probability of a firm’s default in Jordan. We argue
that if ownership structure and concentration affect a firm’s performance, then it
could be used to predict the probability of default (PD), as it could increase or
decrease the firm’s performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing
literature on the effects of ownership structure on firm performance. Section 3
describes data. The independent variables used in the study and the model
specification are introduced in section 3.2. Section 4 introduces the empirical analysis
and the hypothesis test. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Literature Review
The relation between ownership structure and firm performance has been an
important research topic during the last three decades, and produced ongoing debate
in the literature of corporate finance. Theoretical and empirical research on the
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance was originally
motivated by the separation of ownership and control identified by Berle and Means
(1932). Berle and Means (1932) suggested that an inverse correlation could be
observed between the diffuseness (concentration) of shareholdings, and firm
performance, in which ownership structure affects firm performance. Central to this
analysis is the agency theory that explains the conflict of interest between inside
owners and outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, (1976): Fama and Jensen,
(1983)).
Jensen and Meckling, (1976) argue that the relative amount of ownership held by
insiders (management) and outsiders (investors with no direct role in the management
of the firm) provide managers with the incentives to pursue activities to serve their
own benefits. According to their hypothesis, both a firm’s value and its performance
increase with the level of insider ownership. The agency conflict between the ownermanager and outside shareholders is manifest from the manager’s tendency to
appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s resources for his own consumption. This
view was challenged by Demestz (1983), who argues that the ownership structure of a
corporation should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect
the influence of shareholders. According to Demsetz (1983), there should be no
systematic relation between variations in ownership structure and variations in firm
performance.
3

Demestz and Lehn (1985) provide evidence of the endogeneity of a firm’s ownership
structure. They use a measure of the profit rate on a fraction of shares owned by the
five largest shareholding interests, in which ownership structure is treated as an
endogenous variable. They found no evidence of any relation between the profit rate
and the ownership concentration. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) confirm the findings of
Berle and Means (1932). They show the importance of the role played by large
shareholders, and how the price of the firm’s shares increases as the proportion of
shares held by the large shareholders rises. They argue theoretically for a positive
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value.
Following these studies, there have been other studies examining the effects of
ownership concentration on performance. Hill and Snell (1988) show that ownership
structure affects firm performance as measured by profitability through strategic
structure. Later, Hill and Snell (1989) confirm this positive relation for US firms by
taking productivity as a measure of performance. On the contrary, Mc Connell and
Servaes (1990) do not find evidence supporting any direct effect of large shareholders
on firm value. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence in Agrawal and Mandelker (1990)
supports the hypothesis proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) that the existence of
large owners or a high concentration ownership leads to better management and also
better performance, especially when ownership is concentrated in institutional
investors rather than individual investors. Therefore, institutional ownership could
increase a firm’s performance and decrease the probability of default.
Leech and Leahy (1991) analyse the implications of the separation of ownership from
control for a UK firm value. They describe ownership structure using several
measures of concentration and control types. Therefore, ownership structure is
expected to affect a firm’s performance through the effects of ownership
concentration. They found that there is a negative and significant relationship between
ownership concentration and firm value and profitability. Another study of the British
case, Mudambi and Niclosia (1998) confirms this negative relationship between
ownership concentration and performance.
The conflicting results of the effect of ownership structure on a firm’s health point to
the possibility of a non linear relation between ownership concentration and the firm’s
health. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) ignore the endogeneity issue altogether
and re-examine the relation between corporate ownership structure and performance.
A cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 firms was taken in 1980. They measured
performance by Tobin’s Q1, and managerial ownership as the combined shareholdings
of all board members who have a minimum stake of 0.2%. They find no significant
relation in the linear regressions using Tobin’s Q and the accounting profit rate as
alternative measures of performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) analyse 114
NYSE listed corporations in which a majority shareholder owns at least 50.1% of the
common stock. They find that Tobin’s Q is higher if the majority owners are
corporations, while Tobin’s Q as well as the accounting profit rate are significantly
lower for firms with individual majority owners.

1

Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value to the replacement value of the firm, which can be measured
as the market value of equity and debts over the replacement value of net fixed assets and inventory.
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Other works followed the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) study. Included among
these studies are Cho (1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Himmelberg et al
(1999), Holderness et al (1999), Loderer and Martin (1997), McConnell and Servaes
(1990) and Wu and Cai (2002). Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) estimate the effect of
managerial ownership and board composition on Q using panel data for five years.
They find no relation between board composition and performance, but find a
significant non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership and performance, a
positive relation between 0% and 1%, a decreasing relation between 1% and 5%, an
increasing relation between 5% and 20%, and decreasing beyond 20%.
Loderer and Martin (1997) used acquisition data to estimate a simultaneous equation
model in which Q and insider owners are endogenous. Different variables are used to
explain the insider owners, such as Q, log of sales, daily standard deviation of the
firms stock returns, and daily variance of the firm’s stock returns. In order to explain
Q they used log of sales, insider ownership, and a dummy for whether the acquisition
is financed with stock. Insider ownership fails to predict Q, but Q is a negative
indicator of insider ownership.
Cho (1998), using cross-sectional data and ownership information from value line
replicates the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) study and finds a similar nonmonotonic relation between Q and management share holdings.
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) extend the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study
by adding new variables to explain the variation in ownership structure. They used a
fixed effects panel data model and instrumental variables to control various possible
unobserved heterogeneities. Ownership structure is measured by the shareholdings of
insiders. They find that insider ownership is negatively related to the capital-to sales
ratio, but positively related to the advertising-to-sales ratio and operating income to
sales ratio. After controlling these variables and fixed firm effects, they find that
changes in ownership holdings have no significant impact on firm performance.
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) replicate the central aspects of the
Demestz and Lehn (1985) study and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) study. They
find a significant positive relation between firm performance and managerial
ownership with a 0% to 5% range of managerial shareholdings. On the other hand,
they do not find a statistically significant relation beyond 5% managerial
shareholdings which conflicts with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny(1989). Furthermore,
they confirm the endogeneity of managerial shareholdings. The managerial
shareholding found to depend negatively on firm size, performance volatility,
volatility squared, regulation, and financial leverage.
Wu and Cui (2002) study the effect of ownership structure on a firm’s health. They
found that there is a positive relation between ownership concentration and
accounting profits, indicated by ROA and ROE, but the relation is negative with
respect to the market value measured by the share price-earning ratio (P/E) and
market price to book value ratio (M/B). Also, the contribution of government (state)
and institution ownership is significantly positive to company profit, while negative to
the market value.
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Corporate governance mechanisms vary around the world and can produce different
ownership effects on firms’ performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined at least
three kinds of mechanisms in the world economies. In the United States of America
and the United Kingdom, firms substantially rely on the legal protection of investors,
and the ownership structure is dispersed. In Europe and Japan, there is less reliance on
elaborate legal protections, and more reliance on large investors and banks. In the rest
of the world, ownership is typically heavily concentrated in families, in which the
legal protection is weaker than the other types of ownership.
Due to the differences between US corporate governance and other systems such as
the German and Japanese, different relations between ownership and firm value could
be expected. For example, in Japan, where firm ownership is highly concentrated, a
positive and significant effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is
produced. Despite this argument, Prowse (1992) examines the structure of corporate
ownership in a sample of Japanese firms in the mid 1980s. His empirical work
indicated that there is no relationship between ownership concentration and
profitability. Opposing evidence is shown in Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Morck,
Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000), whose results confirm the relation between
ownership concentration and performance.
Chen, Cheung and Stouraiti (2000) found a negative relationship between
concentrated ownership and firm value for a sample of 412 publicly listed firms in the
Hong Kong stock exchange through 1995-1998. Xu and Wang (1997) investigated
whether ownership structure has significant effects on the performance of publicly
listed companies in China. They find that ownership structures, both the mix and
concentration of ownership have a significant effect on the performance of stock
companies. There is a significant and positive relationship between ownership
concentration and firm’s profitability. Also the effect of ownership concentration is
stronger for companies dominated by shareholders than for those dominated by the
state. Firms’ profitability is negatively correlated with the fraction of state owned
shares. They also find that labour productivity declines as the proportion of state
ownership increases. The coefficient for the fraction of the state owned shares are
negative and significant, indicating that state ownership does not help to improve
firms’ performance.
In spite of all these efforts to investigate the effect of ownership structure on firms’
performance until now there are few studies of the effect of ownership structure on
firms’ health especially in the Middle East. Furthermore, there is no serious work that
used ownership structure to predict the probability of default.

3. Data and estimation framework
3.1Data
The data used in this study included 59 publicly listed companies on the Amman
Stock Exchange (ASE), over the period 1989-2002. These companies belong to
different industrial sectors: manufacturing, trade, steel and mining, utility, and real
estate. The banking and insurance sectors are not included in this study as the
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characteristics of these firms are different from the firms in the other industrial sectors
in terms of financial statement, profitability measures and liquidity assessment.
The data set contains detailed information about each enterprise. The major items of
interest are: balance sheets, income statements, ownership structure, and the
percentage holdings of all direct shareholders (defined as any owner possessing more
than 5 and 10% of the company's shares). The full balance sheets and income
statements are usually available from firms as the law requires disclosure.
For data collection a clear and consistent definition of failure or default is required.
While default is usually defined as a corporate condition in which a corporation has
not been able to meet its obligations on a due date, different researchers have used
different criteria to define default. For example, Beaver (1968) used a wider definition
of default, which includes default on loan, over drawn bank account and nonpayment
of a preferred stock dividend. Alternatively, default may be defined in a stricter legal
sense as in Deakin (1972), where default includes only those firms which experienced
bankruptcy or liquidation, and the firm faces legal action.
In the case of Jordan, we define default as a firm that had a receiver or liquidator
appointed, or a firm that was delisted from the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in the
period 1989 to 20022. Furthermore, firms that stop issuing their financial statements
for two years or more are also considered to be failed firms. By law, firms are
obligated to submit their annual financial statements so firms that are unable to submit
their financial statements on the required date are considered as failures. The date of
failure is either the date the liquidator was appointed, or the date of delisting from the
formal market. The actual number of defaulted firms is twenty-nine according to our
definition compared to forty-four as officially claimed. Therefore, within 59 firms in
our sample 29 are failed and 30 are non-failed firms. The non-failed sample was
matched to the failed sample from the same industry and the same year of data
collection.

3.2Variables Selection
Using pooled data for the listed companies in the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), we
calculate four ratios to measure the firm’s performance, return on equity (ROE),
return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, and MBR. In this study Tobin’s Q and MBR are
used to measure the market performance of firms, while the ROE and ROA are
employed as measures representing accounting performance measures. These
performance variables represent the dependent variables and are used separately. The
explanatory variables are ownership fractions, concentration ratios and other control
variables.
To determine the ownership structure and its concentration, various measures of
ownership concentration are constructed to measure the effect of ownership on a
firm’s health. Our measures of concentration are the percentage of shares held by the
largest shareholders (C1), the percentage of the two largest shareholders (C2), the
percentage of the first three largest shareholders (C3) and the percentage of the first
five largest shareholders (C5). We also used the Herfindahl index of ownership
2

This definition is very similar to the one by Izan (1984).
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concentration, the sum of squared percentage of shares controlled by each top 5
shareholders. Table 1 and Table 2 present basic statistics for these concentration
measures for defaulted and non-defaulted firms sample in the Amman Stock
Exchange (ASE).

Insert Table 1 Here
Insert Table 2 Here
At the median, the largest shareholder C1 owns 22.39 per cent in the defaulted firms,
a figure which is larger than 19.56 per cent in the non-defaulted firms. The largest two
shareholders (C2) own 36 per cent in the defaulted firms, a figure which is larger than
27.7 per cent in the non-defaulted firms. The other measures of concentration C3, C4,
C5, and HERF are all larger in defaulted risk compared with non-defaulted firms. The
median largest shareholder C1 in Jordan is large by the Anglo-American standards
and but within the range of those in France and Spain which is 20 and 34 per cent
respectively (Becht and RÖell 1999). The data also reveals that there is a substantial
variation across firms in ownership concentration: Despite the high average, the
largest owner’s value varies between 0 and 100 per cent. In this study we used C5 and
HERF index as an indictor of ownership concentration to investigate whether
ownership concentration increased firm's performance and contribute to firm's default.
Most of the studies about the relation between ownership structure and firm
performance used managerial (insider) ownership as the measure of ownership
structure. Jordan has created different classes of shares, namely government (state),
institutional, Arab, foreign, and individual (citizen). The government shares (state) are
either share owned by government directly or by government agency. In firms with
high government ownership, the insider gain control either through direct government
appointments or through direct political power influence which could affect firm's
performance negatively. These shareholders are different in their interests in the firm
and their incentives and ability to monitor the firm. An important question to be
addressed in this paper is whether ownership structure is consistent with the firm’s
value and performance maximization.
The ownership mix is divided into the fraction owned by government (FGO), by the
foreigner (FFO), by companies (FIN), and by individuals (citizen). The government
participates in about 62% of the 165 industrial and services firms. On the other hand,
companies participate in about 95% of the 165 firms where the percentage varies
between 6% and 99%. Foreigners participate in just 28% of the total number of firms,
whereas the percentage varies between 0.006% and 87% (see Table 3).

Insert Table 3 Here
Controlling for both effects, ownership and performance, we might be able to
distinguish which of these factors are more significant in poorly performing
enterprises. This approach can, as a by-product of our study, serve as indicative
evidence in the recent discussion, whether the ownership structure determines the

8

performance or whether the performance attracts various types of ownership. It also
will help to answer the question of whether the ownership structure affects firms’
health and resources utilization via productivity.

Insert Table 4 Here
Table 4 presents the basic statistics of the ownership structure fraction of defaulted
and non defaulted firms. At the median, the individual (citizen) owns 48.11 per cent
of defaulted firms, a figure which is larger than 46.34 per cent in non defaulted firms.
The fractions of foreigner ownership have the lowest median in the defaulted firms
compared with 4.46 per cent in non defaulted firms.
There are several notable differences. First of all, the defaulted firms do have a lower
median of government ownership compared with non-defaulted firms. Also, the
median of institutional ownership is lower in the defaulted firms compared with the
non defaulted firms. Furthermore, foreigner ownership median in the defaulted firms
are lower than the non-defaulted firms’ median. These initial results suggest that
institutional, Arab, and foreigner ownership reduce the firms’ probability of default.
In this analysis, we will concentrate on the joint factor of Arab and foreigner
ownership rather than taking each one separately as both of them are considered
foreign owners. Definitions of the performance variables, ownership fractions, and
concentration ratios are given in Table 5.
Factors other than ownership structure may also affect firm’s performance and health.
To take them into account, we introduce a set of control variables. These control
variables include ASS3, AGE, TD/TE, LTD/TA, NI/CAP, and TD/TA in this study.
Dummy variables for industrial sectors are used to control the difference between
sectors, DUMi, i= 1, 2,...,5, for manufacturing, trade, steel and mining, utility, and
real estate. Definitions of these variables are given in Table 5. Furthermore, to control
the effect of years on firms’ health and the probability of default, dummy variables for
years are also included in this study, DUMj, j=1, 2,…, 11, for the years 1991 until
20024.

• 4. Empirical work
• 4.1Ownership Structure and Firm’s Performance
We employ three accounting ratios as well as Tobin’s Q to measure the firm’s
performance, the market-to-book value ratio (MBR), ROE, and ROA. Let Y and CR
represent performance and concentration ratio variables respectively. If ownership
structure does not affect firm’s performance, we would find there is no correlation
between Y and CR. Our first null hypothesis is that ownership concentration does
affect the firm’s performance positively.
3

In the previous work, the value of total assets is used to control size effect, e.g. see Morck et al (1988)
and McConnell and Servaes (1990). Other studies is used sales to control for size , e.g., see Xu and
Wang (1997). The value of total sales is tried in this paper. It has a lower explanatory power than
assets, and its inclusion in regressions of ROA and ROE makes the results not significant.
4
The first two years data (both 1989 and 1990) are only used for determining whether the firm is
default and non-default.
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We estimate equation (1) to test the hypothesis for our sample.
Y = β 0 + β1 Log ( Assets ) + β 2 ( AGE ) + β 3 (TD / TE ) +

β 4 ( LTD / TA) + β5Grow + β6CR + β 7 F + e

(1)

where Y is alternatively ROA, ROE, Q, and MBR for firm i as a measure of
performance. The independent variables are represented by concentration ratio (CR),
ownership fraction (F), log assets, age, TD/TE, LTD/TA, and Grow. Only C5 and the
HERF are used as concentration ratios in the estimation to investigate the effect
ownership concentrations on firm’s performance. F is alternatively FGO, FFO and
FIN. e is a error term. The results of the pooled regression are reported in Table 6
where C5 is used for the ownership concentration indicator in Table 7 where the
HERF is used for the indictor.

Insert Table 6 and Table 7 Here
The C5 variables were found to have a positive and significant impact on both ROE
and ROA at least at a 5% level of significance for various equations in Table 6. The
estimated coefficient of the HERF was only significant at a 10% level of significance
in some of ROE and ROA equations. Neither the HERF nor the C5 have any
explanatory power for both Q and MBR, although the sign of the coefficient was
positive in both equations. In all of the regression, five industrial dummy variables
were included as control variables and their coefficient were not significant at any
level of significance.
The significant impact of concentration ratios on ROE and ROA is in support of the
Shleifer and Vishny hypothesis (1986) that large shareholders may reduce the
problem of small investors, and hence increase the firm’s performance. These results
are consistent with Abdel Shahid (2003); that ROA and ROE are the most important
factor used by investors rather than the market measure of performance. This finding
is also consistent with the result of Wu and Cui (2002) that there is a positive
relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profits, indicated by
ROA. The insignificant results of concentration variables in both Q and MBR
equations could suggest that the Jordanian equity market is inefficient, or there could
be other factors that affect the market performance measure, which were missed in
our models.
In summary, we find empirical evidence for the positive effects of ownership
concentration on a firm’s performance using a sample of both defaulted and nondefaulted firms. The positive effect of ownership concentration has a stronger effect
on the accounting measure of performance ROE and ROA than on the market
measure of performance Q and MBR ratios.
Now, we address the issue of the effects of ownership mix on the performance of the
firms. The relevant hypothesis is that if ownership mix is irrelevant to firm
performance, then the ownership fractions will be expected to be insignificant in Eq.
1. Otherwise, if this null hypothesis is rejected, the government ownership FGO is
hypothesized to be negatively related to a firm’s performance as its main focus is on
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social benefit rather than the firm’s profit. It is hypothesized that firms with both
foreign and institutional ownership will have higher performance.
The results in Table 6 indicate that the FGO, the fraction of equity owned by
government, has a negative coefficient in ROE performance equations, and it is
statistically significant at a 10% level of significance. The FFO also, has a negative
coefficient in both ROE and ROA measure of performance, but none of these
coefficients are significant at any level of significance. The FIN, the fraction of equity
owned by institution shareholders, does not seem to have any significant impact on
the profitability of firms as measured by ROE, ROA, Q, and MBR.
There are some conflicting results of the sign of coefficients between the one
estimated from both ROE and ROA equations and the one from the Q-equations. The
FFO, the fraction of equity owned by foreigner, has a negative coefficient in Q, and it
is significant at a 5% level of significance. On the other hand, the government
ownership fraction has positive coefficients and they are significant in the Q
regressions in both Table 6 and Table 7. However, we would argue that the
explanatory power for both ROE and ROA regressions is fairly high with adjusted Rsquared ranging from 50 to 73 percent, while the adjusted R-squared is merely 5 to 15
percent for both MBR and Q equations. Furthermore, the F statistics are significant
and very high for the two measures of performance ROE and ROA, but very low
though it is still significant, for the Q measure of performance.
The significance of ownership characteristics in the equations for ROA and ROE
could be explained by the fact that the fundamental evaluation of companies,
measured by its financial indicator ROA and ROE are the most important factors used
by investors in Jordan to assess a firm’s performance rather than other measures of
performance such as MBR, and Q. This result is consistent with the result of Abdel
Shahid (2003) that ROA is the most important factor used by investors. The research
finding is consistent with the result of Wu and Cui (2002) that there is a positive
relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profits, indicated by
ROA. Thus, investors depend heavily in evaluating their investment on the accounting
performance measure, ROA. The results of empirical investigation are consistent with
Abdel Shahid (2003), and support the theory that there is a relationship between
ownership structure and a firm’s health, according to Jensen and Meckling, (1976).
In all regressions, both the controlling variable firm’s size, ASS, and firm’s growth,
NI/CAP, have a positive impact on the firm’s performance measures ROE and ROA,
and they are significant at least at a 5% level of significance. While TD/TE, and
LTD/TA are found to have a negative impact on both the ROE and ROA, and they are
mostly significant at a 5% level of significance. Firm’s age, AGE, is found to have a
positive but not significant effect on the firm performance measures: ROE, ROA, and
MBR. In general, the sign of the coefficients for those control variables are in
consistent with previous findings. Five industry dummy variables are included as
control variables and their coefficients are not significant at any level of significance.
We also found that none of the coefficients for the dummy variables for years had any
level of significance. Therefore, our results were robust between different years and
across different industrial sectors.
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4.2Ownership Structure and Default Risk
As discussed above, both ownership structure and mix have a significant impact on
the accounting measure of performance ROE. Also, ownership concentration has a
significant impact on the accounting measure of performance ROA. Therefore, we
might use ownership structure and mix as indicators of a firm’s health to predict the
probability of default (PD). Table 8 summarizes government, citizen, institutional,
and foreigner participation in both defaulted and non-defaulted firms. It is expected
that government ownership reduces the probability of default, 61% of the nondefaulted firms have government participation compared with 54% of the defaulted
firms. Foreign ownership also expected to have a significant impact on the probability
of default, as 90% of the non defaulted firms have foreign participation compared
with 39% of the defaulted firms. Institutional ownership is expected to have a positive
impact on a firm’s performance, the institution choose there investment to maximize
its profit so it choose the successful projects.

Insert Table 8 Here
To further examine the issue of a firm’s default risk, we conduct a test to estimate the
probability of default. Many studies used the probit model in default studies such as
Zmijewski (1984), Acharya, Chatterjee and Pal (2003) and Ginoglou, Agorastos and
Hatzigagios (2002). The Probit and logit models are formulated for the Jordanian
companies’ conditions and contain two state dependent variables stat 1= default and
stat 0= non-default.
To investigate whether ownership concentration and mix contributes to a firm’s
default, let Y* represent firm’s status with Y i * as the latent factor. Yi = 1 if Y* is less
than or equal zero if the firm is in default. CR represents ownership concentration
ratios, C5 and HERF. Ownership fraction (F); F= FGO, FFO, and FIN. ε is the
stochastic disturbance term corresponding to the ith (estimated error), ε is N(0,1). If
ownership structure is irrelevant to default probability, the ownership concentration
and fraction will be insignificant. We also would find there is no correlation between
Y* and CR and F. Our basic estimating equation is the following;
Yi * = β 0 + β1 Log ( Assets ) + β 2 AGE + β 3 (TD / TA) +

β 4 ( NI / CAP) + β5CR + β 6 F + ε

(2)

Government ownership, FGO, is hypothesized to be negatively related to the firm’s
default, as their main focus is on social benefit rather than profit. Priorities of
government do not necessarily coincide with firm's performance maximization. For
instance, the government may care more about unemployment or control over certain
strategic industries than the value of state assets. The government will support the
distress firms even until the last moment. Government ownership could affect the
firm's performance negatively but it will definitely decrease the probability of default.
Institutional shareholders (FIN) are more profit oriented and may have more incentive
to monitor the firm. It is hypothesized that firms with institutional ownership FIN will
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have a lower probability of default as they monitor the firm more and their goal is
profit maximization.
Foreign shareholders (FFO) are also more profit oriented than government and may
also have more incentive to monitor the firm. It is hypothesized that firms with
foreign ownership FFO will have a lower probability of default. Furthermore,
ownership concentration C5 is expected to have a negative effect on the probability of
default. Four control variables are used in this study: the firm’s size, the firm’s age,
TD/TA, and the growth ratio NI/CAP. These variables are expected to contribute to a
firm’s default. It is expected that firms with a high debt ratio will have a high PD and
firms with a high profit ratio will have a low PD. Furthermore it is argued that firm's
with big size and age will have a low probability of default.
The models were estimated by using the Stata.8 software package. The software uses
a procedure that estimates the binary model via maximum likelihood for the probit
model. Estimation results of equation (2) using both logit and probit models are given
in Table 9 and Table 10.

Insert Table 9 Here
Insert Table 10 Here
The FGO, the fraction of equity owned by government, is found to have a negative
coefficient in default risk equation, and it is statistically significant at a 5% level of
significance using the logit model in Table 9. The FGO is statistically significant at a
1% level of significance using the Probit model in Table 10. This indicates that
government ownership decreases the probability of default (PD) as the government
has other objectives rather than that of profit. This result is consistent with other
studies such as Lizal (2002) who finds that government ownership reduces the
probability of default (PD). The FFO, the fraction of equity owned by foreigner, has a
positive coefficient and it is insignificant at any level of significances. The FIN, the
fraction of equity owned by institution shareholders does not seem to have any
significant impact on the probability of default, while the coefficient of the
institutional ownership is negative.
From the results of the estimation of the logit models in Table 9, we find that the
ownership concentration measure C5 has a positive and significant impact on the
probability of default, and the effect is statistically significant at a 5% level of
significance in model 1 and model 3. In model 4 we find that the ownership
concentration C5 is not significant in combination with the fraction of foreign owners,
but it still has a negative effect on default risk. Our finding also supports the findings
in the previous section that ownership concentration increases a firm’s performance
which reflects a firm’s health nut it also increase the PD. The estimated coefficient of
the HERF is not significant at any level of significance. The impact of ownership mix
with ownership concentration measure HERF does not affect the significance of
government ownership FGO. Government ownership is still significant at a 5% level
of significance. Neither FFO nor FIN has any explanatory power in predicting the
probability of default. Controlling variables such as the firm’s size, ASS, and the
firm’s age, AGE, do not have any explanatory power in predicting the default risk. In
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contrast, a firm’s growth, NI/CAP, has a significant effect on the probability of
default. This result is not consistent with theory that firms with high growth have a
low probability of default.
We obtain similar results using the probit estimation models in Table 10, but the
results were better than using the logit model. For the logit models the Pseudo R 2 is
ranging from 47 to 60 percent, while the LR ranging from 38 to 49 percent and it is
statistically significant in the corresponding asymptotic Chi-squared distribution at a
high level of significance. On the other hand, for the probit models, the Pseudo
R 2 ranging from 48 to 60 percent, while the LR ranging from 39 to 59 percent, and it
is statistically significant in the corresponding asymptotic Chi-squared distribution.
The results of the probit models are better compared with the logit models.
Similar to the results in the performance regressions, we also found that none of the
coefficients for the dummy variables for years and for industrial sectors are significant
at any level of significance. Therefore, our results are robust between different years
and across different industrial sectors.

5 Conclusions
The possible impact of ownership structure on a firm’s performance has been a
central question in research on corporate governance, but evidence on the nature of
this relationship has been decidedly mixed. While some theories and empirical
investigations suggest that ownership structure affects firm performance, some others
suggest the irrelevance of the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance.
This paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and
concentration and firm performance in Jordanian publicly traded firms for a sample of
59 firms from 1989-2002. This paper not only studies the relationship between
ownership structure, mix and firm’s performance, more importantly this study
investigates the ownership structures and mix of defaulted firms compared with non
defaulted firms.
The paper produces significant and consistent results. First, we find that there is a
significant relation between ownership concentration C5 and the accounting
performance measure ROE and ROA. Secondly, the HERF is not significant at any
level of significance in any measure of performance. The insignificance of the HERF
shows that there could be a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration
and a firm’s performance. Thirdly, we also found that there is a negative significant
relation between government ownership and a firm’s accounting performance, while
the other ownership structure mixes have significant coefficients only in Tobin’s Q
performance measure.
This paper also used the ownership structure to predict the probability of default. Our
results suggested that individual shareholders have no incentive and no capability to
monitor and influence the behavior of management. Furthermore, a certain degree of
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ownership concentration is needed to increase the firm’s performance and to decrease
firm’s chance of default. We also found that government ownership is negatively
related to the probability of default, and the result is significant at a 5% level.
Government ownership was found to decrease the probability of default, but it has a
negative on a firm’s performance. Our results suggest that increasing a firm’s
performance by reducing government participation in a firm’s ownership will cause
some firms to go bankrupt, at least in the short term. Therefore, we suggest a
privatization reform should go gradually and government should provide all necessary
social securities to reduce the negative social impact of a firms’ liquidation. Further
research is needed by increasing a larger sample in the study.
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Tables
Table 1 Ownership Concentration of Defaulted Firms
Ownership Concentration of defaulted firms
Variable Definition
Mean
C1
Largest shareholder
28.29786
C2
Largest two shareholders
36.2275
C3
Largest three shareholders 39.10179
C5
Largest five shareholders
40.39821
Herfindahl index of
ownership
1609.41
HERF

SD
25.58
27.47839
29.2407
30.22506

Minimum
0.00
0
0
0

Median
22.39
36
38.555
38.555

Maximum
99.00
99
99
99

2416.03

0

810.19

9801

SD
19.23575
23.7396
24.76374
26.02797

Minimum
0
0
0
0

Median
19.56
27.4
27.7
27.7

Maximum
87.7
87.7
87.7
87.7

1561.081

0

470.89

7691.29

Table 2 Ownership Concentration of non-defaulted Firms
Ownership Concentration of non-defaulted firm's
Variable Definition
Mean
C1
Largest shareholder
24.13226
C2
Largest two shareholders
31.9071
C3
Largest three shareholders 33.80968
C5
Largest five shareholders
34.61677
Herfindahl index of
HERF
ownership
1109.995

Table 3 Owners participation in industrial and services firms
Individual
participants
Arab
Foreigners
Companies
Government
Arab and Foreigner
Total firms

number of firms block
holders participate in

Percentage in firms
participation

161
122
47
157
103
131
165

0.975758
0.739394
0.284849
0.951515
0.624242
0.793939

Table 4 Characteristics of Ownership Structure
Variable

Defaulted Firms
mean
SD

Median
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Non-defaulted Firms
mean
SD
Median

Government ownership
Individual Ownership
Companies ownership
Foreigner owners

13.079
48.109
24.847
5.838

25.176
32.755
26.449
15.716

0.982
52.323
13.514
0.000

17.798
45.151
25.442
11.015

25.401
25.116
23.004
13.663

3.856
46.346
15.353
4.463

Table 5 Description of Variables
__________________________________________________________________________
ROA
Net income/ total assets
ROE
Net income/ total equity
Tobin’s Q
(Market value of equity+ book value of debt)/book value of assets
MBR
Market value of equity/ Book value of equity
Government
Percentage of share held by government
Arab
Percentage of shares held by Arab
Foreign
Percentage of shares held by Foreigner
Individual
Percentage of shares held by individual
Companies (Institution) Percentage of shares held by institution
Firm Size
Logarithm of the total assets
Firm’s age
log of years
TD/TE
Total debt/ total equity
LTD/TA
Long term debt/total assets
NI/CAP
Net income/ Capitalization
TD/TA
Total debt/ total assets
C5
Larges five shareholders
Herf index
the sum of squared percentage of shares controlled by each top
five shareholders
Dummy 1
Manufacture
Dummy 2
Steel and mining
Dummy 3
Trade
Dummy 4
Utility
Dummy 5
Real estate
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Table 6 Ownerships Concentration (C5) and Mix and Firm’s performance
2

F-Stat
Constant ASS
AGE
TD/TE
LTD/TA NI/CAP
C5
FGO
FFO
FIN
Adj. R
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
ROE -1.86
0.27 0.039
(-5.18)a (4.80)a (0.40)

-0.14
(-8.08)a

-0.54
(-1.76)C

0.24
(2.65)a

0.28
-2.44
(2.44)b (-1.79)c

ROE -1.90
(-5.14)a

0.28
- 0.006 -0.14
(5.01)a (-0.07) (-7.80)a

-0.77
(-2.65)b

0.22
0.18
(2.41)b (1.78)c

ROE -1.87
(-5.17)a

0.27 - 0.0006 -0.14
(4.86)a (-0.01) (-7.96)a

-0.70
(-2.44)a

0.23
(2.64)c

ROA -1.32
(-5.74) a

0.18
0.02
(5.09)a (0.24)

0.02
(1.68)c

-0.30
(-1.52)

ROA -1.33
(-5.75)a

0.18
(5.22a

0.005
(0.08)

0.02
(1.69)c

-0.35
(-1.90)c

ROA -1.32
(-5.75)a

0.18
(5.12)a

0.008
(0.13)

0.019
(1.70)c

-0.33
(-1.80)c

Q

2.55
(2.23) b

-0.31
(-1.79)c

0.50
(1.64)

-0.09
(-1.63)

0.79
(0.81)

-0.10
(-0.35)

-0.18
(-0.49)

Q

2.60
(2.28)b

-0.36
(-2.08)b

0.77
-0.09
(2.64)b (-1.69)c

1.38
(1.54)

0.06
(0.2)

0.28
(0.87

Q

2.71
(2.30)b

-0.39
0.72
(-2.18)b (2.39)b

-0.10
(-1.65)

1.71
(1.84)c

0.05
(0.16)

0.13
(0.40)

MBR 2.45
(0.86)

-0.30
(-0.68)

0.11
(0.14)

0.19
(1.43)

1.46
(0.60)

0.76
(1.09)

1.00
(1.09)

MBR 2.35
(0.83)

-0.28
(-0.64)

0.23
0.15
(0.25) (1.46)

1.04
(0.48)

0.70
(1.20)

1.04
(1.32)

MBR 2.50
(0.87)

-0.31
(-0.71)

1.44
(0.64)

0.79
(1.13)

0.88
(1.09

0.10
(0.13)

0.19
(1.43)

0.26
(4.65)a
0.26
(4.58)a

0.73
-0.10
(-0.53)

0.14
(1.41)

19

21.99

0.73 23.16

0.15
-0.05
(2.07)b (-0.59)

0.53
-0.013
(-0.10)

0.26
0.12
(4.67)a (1.87)c

Note: t statistics are in the parentheses.
a, b, c: indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

0.72
0.18
(1.53)

0.13
(2.05)b

23.66

10.20

0.52 10.08
0.052
(0.70)

0.90
(2.08)a

0.50 10.85
0.14

-1.26
(-2.09)b

2.38

0.14 2.39
0.39
(1.02)

-0.15
(-0.41)

0.09 1.81
-0.06 0.54

-1.62
(-1.09)

- 0.04 0.72
0.33
(0.36)

-0.06 0.55

Table 7 Ownerships Concentration (HERF) and Mix and Firm’s performance
2

F-Stat
Constant ASS
AGE
TD/TE
LTD/TA NI/CAP HERF
FGO
FFO
FIN
Adj. R
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
ROE -1.86
0.28
(-4.94)a (4.81)a

0.03
(0.31)

-0.14
(-7.71)a

-0.67
(-2.14)b

0.22
(2.35)b

0.19
-0.15
(1.11) (-1.08)

ROE -1.88
(-4.97)a

0.29
0.007
-0.14
(4.97)a (0.01) (-7.65)a

-0.79
(-2.65)a

0.20
(2.20)b

0.10
(1.64)c

ROE -1.86
(-5.04)a

0.27
0.01
-0.14
(4.83)a (0.10) (-7.91)a

-0.70
(-2..39)b

0.23
(2.49)c

0.03
(0.21)

0.25
(4..34)a

0.12
(1.07)

ROA -1.32
0.19
0.012
(-5.55)a (5.11)a (0.19)

0.017
(1.51)

-0.37
(-1.86)C

ROA -1.32
(-5.56)a

0.19
0.009 0.018
(5.17)a (0.15) (1.52)

-0.37
(-1.98)b

0.25
0.11
(4.36)a (1.19)c

ROA -1.32
(-5.57)a

0.18
0.014
(5.06)a (0.24)

0.017
(1.49)

-0.35
(-1.86)c

0.26
0.09
(4..49)a (0.35)

Q

2.52
(2.21) b

-0.31
(-1.78)c

0.48
(1.59)

-0.09
(-1.70)c

0.84
(0.88)

-0.11
(-0.40)

Q

2.62
(2.28)b

-0.35
(-2.03)b

0.78
-0.10
(2.66)a (-1.73)c

1.34
(1.47)

0.04
(0.13)

0.17
(0.38)

Q

2.72
(2.31)b

-0.39
0.73
(-2.17)b (2.42)a

-0.10
(-1.67)b

0.04
(0.13)

0.07
(0.14)

MBR 2.43
(0.84)

-0.24
(-0.54)

0.04
(0.77)

0.17
(1.23)

0.92
(0.38)

0.64
(0.90)

0.20
(0.16)

MBR 2.43
(0.85)

-0.25
(-0.56)

0.22
0.17
(0.30) (1.21)

0.96
(0.42)

0.74
(1.05)

0.40
(0.36)

MBR 2.55
(0.88)

-0.29
(-0.66)

1.38
(0.60)

0.74
(1.04)

0.27
(0.23)

0.16
(0.22)

0.17
(1.21)

1.69
(1.81)c

-0.38
(-0.73)

-0.06
(0.31)
0.21
(1.71)c
-0.008
(-0.09)
0.02
(0.15)
0.06
(0.42)

20

0.71

20.50

0.72

22.04

0.50

9.20

0.50

0.95
(2.20)b
-1.19
(-1.98)b

9.21
9.41

0.15

2.43

0.13 2.28
0.40
(1.05)

0.37
(0.34)

0.09 1.78
-0.09 0.36

-1.40
(-0.93)

- 0.07 0.47
0.48
(0.52)

Table 8 Ownership participation in both default and non-default
Government ownership
Individual ownership
Companies ownership
Foreign ownership

21.08

0.50

Note: t statistics are in the parentheses.
a, b, c: indicate significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Default
0.5357143
0.9642857
0.8928571
0.3928571

0.71

Non-Defaulted Firms

0.612903
1
0.935484
0.903226

-0.09 0.38

Table 9 Ownerships Concentration and Mix and Firm’s Default Risk using Logit
Model
2

Constant ASS
AGE
TD/TA NI/CAP C5 HERF FGO FFO FIN Pseudo R LR Chi 2 Prob>chi2
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Model 1 5.02
-1.23
(0.70) (-1.08)

-0.58
(-0.37)

5.26
(1.70)c

-14.96
5.00
(-2.28)b (2.34)b

Model 2 9.12 -1.55
(131) (-1.46)

-1.65
(-1.20)

3.71
(1.53)

-8.43
2.43
(-1.94)b (1.59)

Model 3 9.72 -1.61
(1.36) (-1.49)

-1.62
(-1.20)

3.65
(1.50)

- 8.26
(-1.93)b

Model 4 7.43 -1.40
(1.04) (1.26)

-0.54
(-0.36)

5.11
(1.71)c

Model 5 9.79 - 1.56
(141) (-1.50)

-1.52
(-1.14)

3.70
(1.57)

- 7.16
(-1.83)c

Model 6 10.69 -1.66
- 1.50
(1.48) (-1.55) (-1.16)

3.67
(1.56)

- 6.85
(-1.80)c

-7.76
(-2.43)b

0.60
0.58
(0.24)

0.49

2.57
(1.64)c

-9.99
(-2.07)b

-0.58
(-0.38)

5.38
(1.49)

-5.93
(-2.27)b

1.96
(1.07)

49.20

0.86
(0.36)

2.32
(1.14)

-0.77
(-0.47)

0.49

0.00

40.32

0.00

40.41

0.00

0.56

45.47

0.00

0.47

38.74

0.00

38.83

0.00

0.48

Note: t statistics are in the parentheses.
a, b, c: indicate significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Table 10 Ownerships Concentration and Mix and Firm’s Default Risk using
Probit Model
2

Constant ASS
AGE
TD/TA NI/CAP C5 HERF FGO
FFO FIN Pseudo R LR Chi 2 Prob>chi2
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Model 1 3.05
(0.73)

-0.75
-0.25 2.92
(-1.13) (-0.27) (1.65)c

Model 2 5.27
-0.90
(136) (-1.53)

- 0.94
2.19
(-1.14) (1.55)

-8.33
2.94
(-2.31)b (2.38)b

-4.22
-(2.49)a

-4.77
1.34
(-1.97)b (1.54)

0.30
(0.20)

Model 3 5.42
- 0.91
(1.39) (-1.55)

-0.92
2.17
-4.66
1.39
(-1.14) (1.53) -(1.96)b (1.57)

Model 4 4.53
-0.86
(1.09) (-1.33)

- 0.27
2.92
(-0.32) (1.71)c

-5.69
(-2.12)b

3.27
(1.57)

Model 5 5.67
(147)

-0.89
2.28
(-1.11) (1.63)

- 4.20
(-1.86)c

1.22
(1.07)

-0.87
(-1.11)

-4.04
(-1.83)c

1.36
(1.09)

-0.92
(-1.58)

Model 6 5.94
-0.94
(1.52) (-1.62)

2.52
(1.62)

-0.20
(-0.22)

Note: t statistics are in the parentheses.
a, b, c: indicate significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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-3.27
(-232)b

0.60

49.33

0.00

0.50

40.44

0.00

40.45

0.00

45.66

0.00

0.48

39.12

0.00

0.48

39.14

0.50
0.56

0.44
(0.31)
-0.32
(-0.34)

0.00

